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AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
SPEECH BY
R T HON PROFESSOR SIR GEOFFREY PALMER*
Tena Koutou, Tena Koutou, Tena Koutou, Katoa.
I have greeted you in Maori, the language of the indigenous people
of New Zealand. This will indicate to you that I come from a different
background than the one you and Dean D.D. Ellis come from. Dean
Ellis and I taught together at the University of Iowa. It is a very great
pleasure for me, sir, to be here at this wonderful law school and have
the honor of addressing you and the students here.
I cannot help thinking that the introduction you gave me was
designed to indicate that we in the South Sea Island Nations think uto-
pian thoughts and design utopian schemes - for it is true.' And I
shall engage in another part of such activity this afternoon with the
proposals that I want to put before you about how we ought to develop
a new international law for the environment.
There are two parts to the address which I want to give to you. The
first relates to the general character of international law as it now
comes to us and the second relates to the threats to the environment -
* P.C., K.C.M.G., A.C., Formerly Prime Minister, Attorney General and Minister
for the Environment of New Zealand. Professor of Law Victoria University of
Wellington, Ida Beam Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law University of Iowa.
B.A., LL.B., Victoria University of Wellington; J.D., University of Chicago.
1. See, e-g., GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979); GEOFFREY
PALMER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: A GREENPRINT FOR NEW ZEALAND (1990).
See also the Resource Management Act 1991, [1991] 1 N.Z. STAT. 69 - The Act is 382
pages long and sets up a system of sustainable management of natural and physical
resources in New Zealand.
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the two problems are dynamically interrelated. On these questions I
am an optimist. I think that it is possible to reach the levels of interna-
tional cooperation which are necessary for the world to conquer the
problems that we face relating to the environment. The biosphere is as
thin as the dew on an apple and our welfare on this planet depends on
the dew being kept in good order and condition.2 The threats to our
environment are man made. The solutions lie in our own hands.
We do, however, have a heritage which comes down to us, of inter-
national law. International law has had a bad press by and large.
Many quite respectable countries sometimes do not obey it, but most
countries obey most of the norms most of the time.3 It is significant
that President Bush in relation to the events in the Middle East justi-
fied the actions that the United States took in terms both of interna-
tional law and of United Nation's Charter.4 Such has not always been
the case in relation to actions which the United States takes, but it was
heartening to see that for this international commitment, international
law was offered as the justification for the actions taken. I think we can
look forward to a more prominent part being played by international
law as a determinant of the foreign policy of the United States in the
future. That is a very good thing.
International law suffers from a number of deficiencies. Some juris-
prudential writers have said that international law is not law.5 Many
writers in the field of jurisprudence have problems analyzing interna-
tional law.6 These views of international law are often reflected in the
opinion of ordinary people. My own experience is that sometimes poli-
ticians involved in international affairs talk and think this way. They
will accept that there are norms. They will accept that they should be
2. See THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR
COMMON FUTURE (1987).
3. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE - LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 10 (2d
ed. 1979); THOMAS M. FRANCK, POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
4. Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old
Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); United States: Authorization for the
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution - U.S. PUBLIC LAW 102-1, 102d Cong.
Jan. 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 296 (1991), U.N.S.C.R. 1560 (1990), together with Resolutions
674 (1990) of Oct. 29, and 677 (1990) of Nov. 28. Nine earlier resolutions adopted
between Aug. 2 and Sept. 25, 1990, appear in 29 I.L.M. 1323 (1990).
5. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 176-77 (R. Campbell ed. 2 vol.
1875); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961).
6. JOHN W. SALMOND, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 54 (P.J. Fitzgerald 12th ed.
1966); REGINALD W. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 217-19 (5th ed. 1985).
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followed. But they doubt the ability of anyone to effectively enforce
the rules if they are not followed.
John Austin and the analytical positivists argued that international
law is not law properly so called because it lacks both a legislature and
sanctions.7 H.L.A. Hart argues that international law is not a system
but a set of rules.8 It is not law because it lacks any basic rules of
recognition. The classical answer to the charge is that there are a body
of rules in the community of nations which are followed and can be
enforced.9 It is not so easy, however, to develop a coherent theory as
to why those rules are binding. It may be sufficient to agree with J.L.
Brierly "[t]he best evidence for the existence of international law is that
every state recognizes that it does exist and that it is itself under obliga-
tions to observe it."10 While the statement is valid, it does not tell us
anything about the significance of the differences between international
law and municipal law. Those differences matter when confronting the
problems with the state of the biosphere.
The controversy as to how to characterize international law is essen-
tially barren." The nature of the rules is not altered by the manner in
7. AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 176-77. Austin says, "[b]ut the greatest logical error of
all that is committed by many continental jurists, who include in public law, not only
the law of political conditions, of crimes, and of civil and criminal procedure, but also
international law: which is not positive law at all, but a branch of positive morality."
Id. at 177.
8. Hart, supra note 5, at 209. Professor Hart argues as follows:
For, though it is consistent with the usage of the last 150 years to use the expres-
sion "law" here, the absence of an international legislature, courts with compulsoryjurisdiction, and centrally organized sanctions have inspired misgivings, at any rate
in the breasts of legal theorists. The absence of these institutions means that the
rules for states resemble that simple form of social structure, consisting only of
primary rules of obligation, which, when we find it among societies of individuals,
we are accustomed to contrast with a developed legal system. It is indeed arguable,
as we shall show, that international law not only lacks the secondary rules of
change and adjudication which provide for legislature and courts, but also a unify-
ing rule of recognition specifying "sources" of law and providing general criteria
for the identification of its rules. These differences are indeed striking and the
question "Is international law really law?" can hardly be put aside.
Id. at 209.
9. JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 71 (6th ed. 1963).
10. JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1944).
11. See generally FRANCK, supra note 3; Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the
International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L LAW 705 (1988); HART, supra note 5, at 208-32;
HENKIN, supra note 3, at 4-5; LASSA F. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-15 (8th
ed. 1955); JOSEPH G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-29 (10th
ed. 1989).
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which they are described. But there can be little doubt that interna-
tional law does lack some of the conspicuous features of domestic legal
systems and is for that reason different. International law lacks institu-
tions which can legislate. Certainly treaties can be made and they are
to a large extent followed but treaties, however many and however
comprehensive, differ in respects which are basic from legislation. The
most fundamental difference is in the capacity of legislation to provide
a basic norm which is binding even on those nations which may
disagree.
International law for the most part lacks institutionalized methods
of law enforcement. There is, to put it at its crudest level, no police
person. In some cases breaches of the norms will come to the notice of
other nations, who may or may not decide to do something about them
by diplomatic means. And those decisions will revolve around the
political interests involved, the capacities and power relationships of
the nations concerned. The decision to do anything about breaches of
international law will not usually depend on the fact of the breach.
A key problem in any attempt to deal with the jurisprudential basis
of obligation in international law lies in the concept of sovereignty.12 If
there are more than 170 co-equal sovereign states in the international
community it is hard to see how it is possible to arrive at a system
which includes legislation, enforcement, and third party adjudication
unless all the nations agree. In its strongest form, arguments about
sovereignty are used unhesitatingly by political decision makers to tell
decision makers of other nations to keep out of matters which are not
their business. What Brierly called the "incubus" of sovereignty still
sits heavily upon the body of international law. And as Brierly said, it
stands "for something in the relations of states which is both true and
very formidable.""3 But sovereignty does not stand for everything. It
is not an absolute. It does not and cannot mean a state of international
lawlessness.
Sovereignty casts a long shadow. Consider Professor Ian Brownlie's
formulation in the latest edition of his treatise: "[t]he sovereignty and
equality of states represent the basic constitutional doctrine of the law
of nations, which governs a community consisting primarily of states
having a uniform legal personality." 14 From the principle Brownlie
12. BRIERLY, supra note 9, at 47.
13. Id.
14. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (4th ed.
1990).
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deduces a number of consequences, the most important of which for
present purposes concerns consent. He points out "the jurisdiction of
international tribunals depends on the consent of the parties; member-
ship in international organizations is not obligatory; and the powers of
the organs of such organizations to determine their own competence,
to take decisions by majority vote, and to enforce decisions, depend on
the consent of member states.""5 These are the features which pose an
obstacle to the development of an international law to deal effectively
with the problems of biosphere. They have to be overcome by means
of acceptance of an international set of rules for this particular purpose
which can be applied universally.
Political decision makers dwell little on theory and even less on juris-
prudence. They want something practical that works. If they can be
convinced that a broadly acceptable regime can be worked out that will
offer the prospect of solving the problems of the biosphere, for exam-
ple, they will not quibble at the surrender of some sovereignty. The
greater challenge is to design the regime, it is a formidable undertaking
from both a technical and a political point of view.
The ordering of the affairs of nations in their relationships with one
another has steadily eroded the power of nations to please themselves.
The complexity of the modern world and the plethora of intricate trea-
ties sometimes on highly specialized subjects which provide the basis of
most international obligations today have whittled away sovereignty.
Political decision makers most assuredly do not think of themselves as
inhabiting a world where they can take any actions they choose regard-
less of the consequences to other nations and people. They may choose
to articulate defenses to their actions on the basis of sovereignty but
they understand increasingly their mutual interdependence. So much
international business between nations is transacted on the telephone,
facsimile transmission machine, or by personal visits and international
meetings that this reality is inescapable. These realities greatly affect
the context in which the instruments of international law function.
The formal rules tend to lag behind the contemporary reality.
I noticed, as an international and national politician, that there is a
difference between domestic law and international law. Political deci-
sion makers take legal advice when they make decisions. Cabinet pa-
pers that come up are accompanied by a legal opinion or a summary of
legal advice, if that is pertinent, to the paper. The purpose is to advise
15. Id. at 287-88.
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ministers what the law is and whether there might be court actions as a
result of the government's decision to decide to do A or B.
In my experience, ministers would sometimes debate, in the privacy
of the Cabinet room if a law case were taken, whether the government
would succeed. It turned out that in domestic questions the provision
of legal advice to ministers was a significant, sometimes controlling va-
riable in their decision making. They were deterred from making and
taking decisions which would not be upheld in the courts. I am talking
about a legal system which knows nothing of Marbury v. Madison 16
and remains innocent of any doctrine of judicial review holding stat-
utes passed by the Parliament unconstitutional. Parliament in New
Zealand is sovereign.7 It can make whatever law it likes. The courts
cannot interfere. Nonetheless, government decisions and ministerial
actions can be reviewed by the courts under the common law principles
of administrative law.
On international problems, the government received legal advice.
But I found that ministers' attitudes to international legal advice
tended to be more distant. That is to say they did not regard it as such
a controlling variable in their decision making as domestic legal advice
tended to be. In the international sphere, ministers frequently regarded
the advice as to what the current state of law was on a subject as less
important than thie political aspects of the dispute and what it would
do to our relations with the other nations involved. And so the polit-
ical aspects would be more prominent than the legal.
The truth is that the ministers would feel that there was a set of
international norms that should be followed by New Zealand, but there
did not seem to be a legal system which was as clear and direct in its
impact as the domestic legal system. The reasons for that attitude are
really the reasons that the analytical positivists regarded international
law as not being law properly so called.
The weaknesses of international law have long been accepted, and to
some extent disregarded by scholars of international law. International
jurists know there are an increasing body of customary rules of interna-
tional law which are followed and which are binding on states. They
know also that there is an increasing body of conventional law made up
of treaties and multi-lateral conventions which are negotiated with in-
creasing frequency.
16. 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803).
17. For an explanation of New Zealand's system of government, see GEOFFREY
PALMER, UNBRIDLED POWER (2d ed. 1987).
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The result is, I suppose, that conventional international law acts as
something of a substitute for legislation, but it is not the same and the
reason that it is not the same is important. The rules of treaty law are
based on a primary principle of consent.18 The general rule is that
nations cannot be bound by a treaty if they do not become parties to it
and thereby consent to it. Now that rule has long been an obstacle to
the development of what I might call international legislation. It has
been an obstacle to the development of a set of laws on any extensive
basis that is binding on states when they explicitly do 'not consent to it.
The difficulty is very significant in relation to the subject matter of this
address. It means, in relation to both the ozone layer and climate
change, that there is no legislature. There can only be treaties. There
is no obligation on any nation state to become a party to a particular
treaty. That is the first difficulty.
The second difficulty of international law which becomes obvious
when we are dealing with global environmental issues relates to adjudi-
cation. The International Court of Justice, in Article 36, has a compul-
sory jurisdiction clause but the compulsory jurisdiction clause is, in
fact, optional.19 States can accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
court or not as they see fit. There is at the moment only one perma-
nent member of the Security Council of the United Nations which ac-
cepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice.20 That nation is Great Britain.
The United States formally accepted the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice until Nicaragua saw fit to take the United States
to the International Court of Justice whereupon the United States
picked up its bat and ball and went home in high dudgeon.21 For a
nation based on the rule of law, and a nation which wishes to uphold
18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF
39/27 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
19. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 STAT. 1031, 75 No. 993, 3
Bevan 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1052.
20. BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 726.
21. See Anthony D'Amato, Comment, Modifying US Acceptance of the Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 385 (1985); Patrick M. Norton, The
Nicaragua Case: Political Questions Before the International Court of Justice, 27 VA. J.
INT'L L. 459 (1987); W. Michael Reisman, Comment, Has the International Court Ex-
ceeded its Jurisdiction?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1986). See also U.S. Decision to With-
draw from the International Court of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Human Rights and International Organization of the House of Commons on Foreign
Affairs, 99th Congress, Ist Sess. (1985) (especially statements by Abraham D. Sofaer,
Legal Advisor, Department of State; Professor Richard N. Gardner, Columbia Univer-
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the rule of law in the international community that was, I suggest, a
disgraceful action. But it was no worse than the action which France,
another permanent member of the Security Council, took when Aus-
tralia and New Zealand brought proceedings against France in the In-
ternational Court of Justice in the Nuclear Tests case in 1974.22
France refused to appear, and revoked its acceptance of the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Less than a
third of the nation states in our world accept that compulsory jurisdic-
tion, and that is a matter of grave concern.
The third institutional characteristic to which I wish to draw your
attention in international law is the state of the United Nations Charter
which contains no reference to the environment, save a fleeting refer-
ence to "good neighborliness."23 There is in the United Nations a Se-
curity Council, a Trusteeship Council, an Economic and Social
Council, but there is no environmental organ. There is no chapter of
the United Nations Charter dealing with the environment. Undoubt-
edly, if that Charter were being drawn up today such an omission
could not and would not be tolerated. What we have instead is the
United Nations Environment Program headquartered in Nairobi.24
That program, of course, is funded voluntarily by members of the
United Nations. It has no institutional teeth. It has no real power
except to act as a sort of clearing house and a general catalyst for en-
couragement and coordination. Given the constitutional weakness, the
United Nations Environment Program has performed with remarkable
skill and deftness, particularly in relation to the ozone layer. Its work
is a tribute to its most able Executive Director, Dr. Mostafa Tolba.
It is to the ozone layer that I now come. The depletion of the ozone
layer would lead to some very serious problems. We who live in the
South Seas became greatly disconcerted when the evidence about the
sity School of Law; and Professor Bums H. Weston, Independent Commission on Re-
spect for International Law and University of Iowa College of Law).
22. Nuclear Test cases (Austl. v. Fr; N.Z. v. Fr.), Interim Protection, 1973 ICI Rep.
99 and 135 (orders of June 22), 1974 ICJ Rep. 253 and 257 (judgments of Dec. 20).
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 74.
24. See Institutional and Financial Arrangement for International Co-operation, G.
A. Res. 2997 (XXVII) (Dec. 15, 1972). For full text of the resolution establishing
UNEP, see Louis R. SOHN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION 460
(1986). For a detailed account of the formation of UNEP, see generally, LYNTON K.
CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EMERGENCE AND DIMEN-
SIONS 193-94 (1983). For a complete collection of official documents relating to UNEP,
see UNEP, COMPENDIUM OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY (1978).
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hole in the ozone layer opening up over Antarctica became clearer and
clearer. We live not so very far away from Antarctica and we have,
indeed, on our television screens all summer advertisements of the bum
time. It tells you, for example, that the burn time in a particular town
on a particular day will be seventeen minutes. This is to indicate to
people that they cannot stay outside for longer than seventeen minutes
without the prospect of sunburn, and they should take preventative
measures. The risks of skin cancer are high in New Zealand. We, with
the state of Queensland, have the highest rates of skin cancer in the
world.
The ozone layer does the great service of blocking out ultraviolet
light. Ultraviolet rays when they come through the atmosphere can
cause increased rates of skin cancer. They can cause cataracts of the
eyes. They can interrupt the ecology of the food chain in the seas.
Depletion of the ozone layer is a relatively new problem. It is the
result of chloroflourocarbons invented by General Motor's scientists in
1929. They did not come into general use until a bit later than that.
Chloroflourocarbons, or CFCs for short, have the great advantage of
being very effective refrigerants for use in refrigerators and air-condi-
tioning equipment, also as propellants in aerosols, for cleaning electri-
cal equipment and computers. Halons, a related chemical, are very
effective at putting out fires, particularly in tanks and aircraft.
So when the nations of the world gathered in Vienna in 1984 to ne-
gotiate the provisions of the Vienna Convention on substances deplet-
ing the ozone layer, there was quite a lot of resistance from the
industry who produced CFCs, big multinational chemical companies,
who said not to act precipitately.2" Do not do anything too quickly
because we do not know that this problem is really as serious as some
scientists say. And whatever you do, remember, they said, the great
advantages of these chemicals and remember the cost to the economy if
they can no longer be used.
And so, at the time of the negotiation of the Vienna Convention it
was possible to negotiate a framework convention only.26 It was a sig-
nificant convention, however, because it asked for international cooper-
ation in the exchange of information. It set up a secretariat as well as a
25. John W. Kindt & Samuel P. Minifee, The Vexing Problem of Ozone Depletion in
International Environmental Law and Policy, 24 TEx. INT'L L.J. 261, 262 (1989).
26. See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985
entered into force Sept. 22, 1988, U.N. Doe. UNEP/19.53/Rev.1, S. Treaty Doec. No. 9,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1529.
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dispute settlement mechanism. It was a great achievement. But it did
not commit any nation to cease emitting anything. There was no rule
about reduction.
It did not take long for the state of scientific evidence to change.
When that scientific evidence changed what we found was that things
were very bad indeed. So nations gathered again together at Montreal
and there they negotiated the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Con-
vention on substances depleting the ozone layer.27 This time there was
a set of rules which required a reduction in emissions of ozone deplet-
ing substances by fifty percent by the end of the century, with an allow-
ance for developing countries.28
Hardly was the ink dry on the Montreal Protocol before more holes
in the ozone layer were discovered. There was even one in the Arctic.
That made the Northern Hemisphere people think more carefully than
they had been thinking prior to that; at least that is what we thought in
the Southern Hemisphere. The result was that a new set of interna-
tional meetings had to be held. In 1989, a meeting was held in Hel-
sinki, in which a declaration was made that the Montreal Protocol
needed to be revised.29
The Helsinki declaration was an example of soft law. Soft law has
great utility in the environmental area. Declarations are made, polit-
ical commitments are given - they are not legally enforceable, they
are not capable of being adjudicated by third parties, but they create a
political atmosphere in which progress can be made. Do not denigrate
soft law in the international environmental area - it has its uses. The
Helsinki soft law instrument of 1989 was converted successfully into
the amendments to the Montreal Protocol made in London in 1990
which, in fact, said all ozone depleting substances must be phased out
by the year 2000 - all of them.30 Even that may not be quick enough,
we now learn.
Tucked away in the Montreal Protocol where hardly anyone noticed
27. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, with Annex A, Done at
Montreal, Sept. 19, 1987, entered into force Jan. 1, 1989, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1550
(1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
28. Montreal Protocol, supra note 27.
29. The Helsinki Declaration for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, May 2, 1989,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1335 (1989). See Conference Report U.N. Doc. UNEP
Ox.L.Conv. 1/5, Apr. 27, 1989.
30. Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer done at London, June 29, 1990, reprinted in RICHARD E. BENEDICT, OZONE
DIPLOMACY - NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 242 (1991).
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it was a very novel provision. Remember that one of the defects of
international law was that there was no legislative process. Pay atten-
tion to this. It relates to revisions to the Montreal Protocol. Article
9(c)(2) provides:
In taking such decisions, the Parties shall make every effort to
reach agreement by consensus. If all efforts of consensus have
been exhausted, and no agreement reached, such decisions shall,
as a last resort, be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the
Parties present and voting representing at least fifty percent of the
total consumption of the controlled substances of the parties.
The measure was further refined in the 1990 London Amendments
to Montreal Protocol so that the final sixteen words of the provision
were deleted and the following words substituted: "a majority of the
parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5 present and voting
and a majority of the parties not so operating present and voting." The
effect of the new provision is to give both developing and developed
countries an effective veto; because a two-thirds majority is required for
change, it must include a simple majority from each group. The provi-
sion is a manifest and important departure from the rule of unanimous
consent. It is done by a proleptic means. You set up a rule of proce-
dure in advance as to how you are going to arrive at a rule that will be
binding. Then you arrive at the rule itself later. It is the beginning of a
legislative process. It is the beginning of a means of developing binding
rules on nations even when not all nations agree. There are some
precedents for this in international organizations, technical rules in the
field of International Civil Aviation Organization and a number of or-
ganizations of that type. The International Labor Organization also
has an elaborate institutional way of settling the content of
conventions.
The problem with climate change is that the social and economic
impact of the policy decisions are much wider than for the ozone layer.
Ozone is a relatively simple problem. The cause of it is world known
and the cures are obvious. The causes of it are manmade chemicals
and the cure is to stop using the chemicals. The technology is now
becoming available to allow that to occur.
Climate change is a horse of a very different color. Climate change
is caused by the balance of greenhouse gases getting out of kilter.3 '
The greenhouse gases and the ozone problem are related, in that one of
the most potent greenhouse gases is, in fact, CFCs. But there are
31. GLOBAL WARMING: THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT (J. Leggett ed. 1990).
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others and they are more important; carbon dioxide is the biggest.
Carbon dioxide is being produced in unprecedented quantities and it is
being released into the atmosphere. The consequence will be, according
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, that the world is
going to heat up.32 When the world heats up and how far it heats up is
a matter still of some scientific controversy. The truth of the matter is
that the greenhouse gases, which are nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide, and
methane (a substance which we have noticed in New Zealand is also
produced by flatulent sheep of which we have many millions), are all
substances which heat up the atmosphere.
Now we need greenhouse gases. Without greenhouse gases we will
all freeze to death. The greenhouse gases provide the means of keeping
the heat from the sun on the earth in ways that sustain life. If you do
not believe that, take a trip to Venus and Mars and it will be demon-
strated very clearly to you. But the difficulty is you can have too much
of a good thing.
Ever since the industrial revolution we have been burning increasing
amounts of coal and we have been chopping down increasing numbers
of trees, which are carbon sinks. And we have taken to riding about in
motor cars, which use fossil fuels. Indeed, the United States produces
21 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions for 4.5 percent of the popu-
lation of this earth.33 There are also a number of developing countries
who produce a lot because methane is produced by rice paddies. Chop-
ping down tropical forests is a big contributor to the greenhouse effect.
Now, what do you make of all of this? What I make of it is very
clear. There needs to be action in June of 1992, at the biggest environ-
32. See IPCC (WMO/UNEP), First Assessment Report, Vol. 1: Overview, Work-
ing Group I Policymakers Summary; Working Group II Policy Makers Summary;
Working Group III Policymakers Summary; Policymakers Summary of the Special
Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries (Aug. 1990); IPCC
(WMO/UNEP), First Assessment Report Overview (Aug. 1990); IPCC
(WMO/UNEP), Policymakers Summary of the Scientific Assessment of Climate
Change, report prepared for IPCC by Working Group I (Jun. 1990); IPCC
(WMO/UNEP), Policymakers Summary of the Formulation of Response Strategies,
report prepared for the IPCC by Working Group III (Jun. 1990); IPCC
(WMO/UNEP), Scientific Assessment of Climate Change, report prepared for IPCC by
Working Group I (Jun. 1990); IPCC (WMO/UNEP), Climate Change: The IPCC Im-
pact Assessment, report prepared by IPCC Working Group II (Jun. 1990) (Tegart,
Sheldon, Griffiths eds.); and IPCC (WMO/UNEP), Formulation of Response Strate-
gies, report prepared by Working Group III (Jun. 1990).
33. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT),
CHANGING BY DEGREES - STEPS TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE CASES (1991).
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mental meeting that has ever been held on this planet, sponsored by the
United Nations in Brazil.34 There, among other things, a Framework
Convention for climate change is to be signed. There must be within
that convention some new elements of international law to deal with
the problem.
First, there must be a legislative process which is capable of making
binding rules which states must follow, even when they do not agree.
Second, there must be some means of having compulsory adjudication
of disputes, if not to the International Court of Justice, then perhaps to
a special tribunal which is set up or capable of being set up under the
Convention which is negotiated. Finally, there needs to be a new insti-
tution. There needs to be an institutional authority capable of monitor-
ing what the nation states are doing, blowing the whistle on them when
necessary, and acting as an effective coordinator of what action needs
to be taken.
In conclusion, all I would like to do is to repeat the substance of
what I said at the General Assembly of the United Nations in general
debate in 1989:35
In New Zealand's judgment, the traditional response of interna-
tional law, developing international legal standards in small incre-
mental steps, each of which must be subsequently ratified by all
countries, is no longer appropriate to deal with highly complex
environmental problems of the future.
The time has come for something more innovative for a concep-
tual leap forward in institutional terms. And we see the need for
the establishment of a new organ in the United Nations system -
perhaps it would be called the "Environmental Protection Coun-
cil".... I have no doubt that if the Charter were being drawn up
today, there would be widespread support for including among the
organs of the United Nations a body empowered to take binding
decisions on global environmental issues.... In our view, nothing
less than an institution with this status will command the neces-
sary respect and authority to achieve what is required.
Perhaps the most effective way to achieve this would be the in-
clusion in the United Nations Charter of a new chapter dealing
with the environment.
That proposal did not suggest that we should do away with the
34. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/228, U.N., GAOR 44 Supp. No. 49 (Dec. 22, 1989).
35. Provisional Verbatim Record of the 15th Meeting, [1989] G.A., 44th Sess. at 61-
79 U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.15 (1989).
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United Nations Environment Program. Instead, I argued that we
should strengthen it, but as I went on to say, the missing institutional
link is the equivalent of a legislature.
I would envisage the new Environmental Protection Council becom-
ing the point in the United Nations system which links the streams of
economic and environmental advice. It would perform a function that
currently falls between the cracks in the mandates of all existing orga-
nizations and it would have responsibility for taking coordinated deci-
sions on sustainable policies for global development.
I do not pretend that the politics of global warming is at all easy.
Any politician who starts suggesting to advanced countries that people
will not be able to drive their cars with the frequency to which they are
accustomed, or that the burning of coal will have to somehow be con-
trolled or curtailed, or that conservation policies for energy will need to
be adopted with some rigor - will not find great popularity. The pub-
lic is quite unprepared for such policies because they haven't been told
about the threat. A massive program of education is required about all
these issues if the state of public opinion is to be produced that will
allow these changes to be made. But whatever your view of the scien-
tific data, it is beyond doubt in my judgment that we face a potential
catastrophe.
I think we can all find that we have sufficient common values; that
we want our species to survive; that we don't want to have a wholesale
catastrophe. In some scenarios a number of the nations of the world
will be inundated and cease to exist because of rising sea levels. In
some areas which are now desert there will be rainfall, but other areas
which are now quite habitable will become desert. A wholesale change
in the world's patterns of weather, an inability to grow things where
they are now grown, widespread inundation, even in those countries
which are big enough to survive having their coastlines inundated, will
be serious.3
6
A number of nations in my part of the world - Tuvalu, Kiribaiti, and
the Tokelau Islands (for which New Zealand has special responsibility)
may cease to exist. I do not see why those nations should cease to exist
in order that Americans may expend more fossil fuels than anyone else
does. It is necessary to arrive at an international agreement which will
36. See IPCC (WMO/UNEP), Working Group I Policymakers Summary; Working
Group II Policymakers Summary; Working Group III Policymakers Summary.
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remove the peril of climate change. Climate change is only one of the
serious problems facing the global environment. To meet the chal-
lenges, new methods of making international law are needed.
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